Is Phenomenology Self Referential?

Phenomenology, as I stated in class, is directed toward the study of experience. In that way, we might even think about experience as the “unit of analysis.”

Phenomenology is different than some qualitative traditions. Oftentimes, we know very little about the “participants” in the study. That is because it is the experience we are after!

Therefore, we don’t really do phenomenology “on” people. We do it “with” them as we seek to understand the meaning of an experience that matters for us.

As Van Manen puts it, “hermeneutic phenomenological research is a search for the fullness of living.” It aims to edify even more than it aims to inform. It is, as Van Manen states, a moral project.

There is no room for relativism here—when we describe an experience, we are staking a ground for its intrinsic meaning, even when such experiences are saddening or horrific. We are not affirming that all is right with the world, but that the “now” has a moral force that requires our tactful response.

Pieces like the Stephen Smith article might seem self-referential. But ask yourself—how much do you really know about Stephen Smith at the end of the article? Do we know anything more about him than that he has had an experience which you have also had, or might also one day have?

We are present in our research but, in the phenomenological tradition, we are not at its center. What centers in phenomenological research are the meaningful bonds, the intentional relationship, that ties us to the world. (Human) Being—subjects meaningfully engaged with their worlds—is what centers.

Is phenomenology therefore nothing more than an essay on the fullness of living? Perhaps not. But the insights that discipline and shape the project are grounded in a tradition. To “essay” something is to try it out, to test one’s self. In that way, all phenomenology is an essaying of our ability to speak the truths of our Being!